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3 it was said in a joint judgment in the High Court that a trial judge had been wrong to characterise a transaction as a sham by applying the ordinary meaning of the word:
The primary judge was wrong to characterise [the transactions], as he did by his references to "artifice", "façade" and "charade", as shams. "Sham" is an expression which has a well-understood legal meaning. 4 Their Honours went on to say about that well-understood legal meaning:
It refers to steps which take the form of a legally effective transaction but which the parties intend should not have the apparent, or any, legal consequences.
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That particular legal meaning has a number of elements which distinguish it from the ordinary meaning of sham found in common usage. First, it relates specifically to something which purports to have a legal meaning and effect, such as a contract, trust, resolution, conveyance, transfer, lease, mortgage, sale, multi-partied transaction or unilateral action which would, if genuine, ordinarily have legal effect. 6 It is, in other words, essential to a sham that what is deliberately created as the pretence is something which can and purports to have legal consequences. Secondly, it is essential to the finding of a sham that the parties intended that what is created does not have its purported legal effect.
Critical to that element of the legal meaning of "sham" is that the parties creating the artifice actually intended to create something as a sham or artifice and actually intended that it not have the legal consequences it would appear to have.
The intention being referred to in this context is the actual or subjective intention of the parties rather than one presumed or imposed by law upon objective facts whatever might have been the actual intention of the parties. It is not like an intention which the law may objectively presume parties to have when they enter a contract: in the case of shams the law is concerned with what intentions the parties actually had.
It may be useful in this context to note that the intention needed for there to be a sham is different from the circumstances in which the law might impose a constructive The inquiry into the actual intention of the parties whose intention is relevant to create the legal effect of something which is said to be a sham is an inquiry into the actual intention which the relevant parties actually had. What evidence will be relevant to such an inquiry will depend upon a precise identification (a) of the subject matter said to be the sham and (b) of those whose intention is relevant to determine whether the "thing" said to be a sham has its legal effect or not. Some "things", for example, like a unilateral declaration of trust, or a gift, require the intention of only one person to have legal effect. In such cases it will be the intention of that one person that will determine whether that thing is a sham. Other things, however, have legal effect where more than one person intends to create something with legal effect. In such cases it will be necessary for all persons to have the shamming intention and the thing may have legal effect where one or more, but not all, persons to that thing had an intention to create a sham. 9 Where, for example, a contract is made between two parties its legal effect will depend upon the objective intention of the parties. A critical question which arises in this context is the extent to which the subjective, or actual, intention of the individuals concerned can be based upon objective circumstances which conflicts with oral testimony of an actual intention to create the legal rights purportedly created. An aspect of that question is whether the finding of a shamming intention may be made upon the balance of objective evidence some of which may support a finding of sham and some of which may not. In the tax context, for example, it may sometimes be the case that an actual intention to create legal relations existed (and therefore pointing against a finding of sham), but that the overall, economic, business or financial outcome achieved (and intended) is inconsistent with those legal rights (and therefore supporting a finding of sham).
Subjective Intention based upon Objective Facts
In some cases the actual intention of the parties may be found to be a sham even though there is evidence of an actual subjective intention that the impugned The outcome in Raftland was not based upon a rejection of the evidence that those making the resolution intended it to be legally effective to achieve its objectives, nor the rejection of the evidence that they thought that the resolution had been legally effective, but, rather, that that evidence of the actual intention needed to be We agree with the Board and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
[…] Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary definitions of each term used in the statutory definition…
[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.
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The opinion of the Supreme Court, on appeal, placed emphasis on the absence of business or corporate purpose to a transaction (rather than the motive for the transaction) which might otherwise have appeared to come within the words used by Although this analysis is not the same as that in Raftland, it does have an overlap and similarity with it. In both cases, something which purported to have had legal effect was found not to have done so. In both cases a determining feature of the outcome was that what the transaction did was not what one would expect to find in transactions of the kind they purported to be. There are, of course, significant differences between the reasoning in Raftland and the economic substance doctrine in the United States, however, the similarities suggest interesting issues for further exploration.
The second feature of interest from Raftland is the extent to which the doctrine can apply outside of the field of tax. Raftland was a tax case but the reasoning leading to the decision that the resolution was a sham is not restricted to tax cases. The basis of determining that something may be a sham by reference to a comparison between actual outcomes and purported outcomes has potentially broader application beyond taxation. Instruments and transactions are generally held to have the legal effect they purport to create and are not generally held not to have those legal effects because they do not achieve what they purport to achieve. The legal effect of something, in other words, is not usually determined by whether they are achieved but by whether they were intended. A consequence of the reasoning in Raftland, however, may be a need for trustees, and their advisers, to evaluate whether legal effects intended to be created by acts, instruments and transactions are able to be achieved. The intention of the parties is usually that the legal rights created by the trust is as they purport to be, but a wider inquiry into the facts may reveal a disconformity between the purported legal rights and the business and economic realities.
The Relevance of Motive
The motive of a party who is said to have created a sham may be irrelevant to determining whether a transaction is to be characterised as tax avoidance, but it may be relevant to determining the intention of those entering into the otherwise legally effective transaction. The majority in Raftland accepted that the tax avoidance purpose of the arrangements had significance to the identification of the legal rights created by the arrangements, although their Honours considered that those circumstances ought not to distract attention from the ultimate issues that needed to be 23 In each case it will be necessary to determine precisely the intention that needs to be found as the sham; and the evidence about motive, to be relevant, must bear upon that intention by showing that there was no intention to create the rights which appear to have been created. administration. Trustee resolutions of trust income are frequently made with the motive of achieving the best tax outcome, but such a motive, all things being equal, will be irrelevant to whether a sham was intended. A trustee's resolution distributing income will usually create the legal rights and the actual consequences which the resolution purports to create, whatever might have been the collateral motive for doing so. A motive of minimising the burden of tax will, in the ordinary course, be irrelevant to whether a resolution was a sham. That will, of course, also generally be true of the creation of the trust.
Emerging Shams
A number of cases have considered the possibility of trusts, or parts of trusts, becoming shams (and presumably also ceasing to be shams) after their creation.
In that context it will be important to bear in mind that the relevant inquiry will be into the existence of an intention to create a sham and not into whether there has been a breach of trust. In Raftland Kirby J accepted that a sham could "develop over time if there is a departure from the original agreement and the parties knowingly do nothing to alter the provisions of their documents as a consequence". In a number of cases it has been argued that a category of "emerging" sham trusts exists with the effect that a trust which was not a sham when created can subsequently become a sham. Even though a valid trust may have come into existence, on this view, the trust will become a sham if the parties to it later share the intention that others should be deceived by the apparent relation.
This reasoning appears to be fallacious. 30 Part of the reasoning in support of the proposition for which the learned authors contended appears to be that a trustee "who has bona fide accepted office cannot divest himself of his fiduciary obligation by his own improper acts". 31 "is flawed" and that the use of a trust deceptively or inconsistently with its true nature "is a breach of trust which does not deny the trust's existence". 32 It may be difficult to talk in generalities about the issue because much will depend upon the content of what is said to be the sham, the specific facts of each case and the relevant intention which needs to be found to be a sham. However, whether sham may emerge in a trust that began genuinely, raises questions about distinguishing between a sham trust and a breach of trust. The issue also points to the need to be precise about what is impugned as a sham because what may be challenged as a sham may not be the trust itself but, rather, may be some step, act or other thing done purportedly pursuant to the trust. In Raftland it was not all of the trusts, or the whole of the transactions entered into, which were held to be a sham, but only that resolution of the arrangements comprising those trusts, resolutions and transactions which had purported to create a tax effective beneficial entitlement in the E & M Unit Trust.
Indeed, as the majority observed, there was no challenge to the power of the trustee of the Brian Heran Discretionary Trust to apply the income of that trust to the Raftland Trust itself. 33 Plainly a trust may be genuine though subsequently used to facilitate a sham transaction, at least to the extent that all participants continue in the collusion. 34 The fact that the sham may also be a breach of fiduciary duty may not deny the sham its character of a sham, nor otherwise deny the trust as otherwise effective to impose duties on the trustee.
The Need to Revisit
The topic of sham trusts is likely to be of ongoing concern for some time to come for trustees, estate planners and their advisers. The reason for the concern is in part caused by the potential uncertainty of content when we refer to an intention to create a 
